Operations Dashboard

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CEO Opportunity, Private Prep

Operations Dashboard

AIOps platform purpose-built for the SAP ecosystem (avantra.com). London-founded, majority-backed by Resurgens Technology Partners since Aug 2024. Via Alexandra Bossetta, Bespoke Partners.
~$19M ARR, ~9% 1H26 growth Breakeven, ~90% gross margin Board: 100% Resurgens Technology Partners
~$19M
ARR
per Bespoke, Aug 13 call
~9%
1H26 growth
target: a credible path to $100M
Low-mid 90s
Retention (insider figure)
Dave Keil, Aug 20 call, conflicts with spec's >100% claim
~2 yrs
CAC payback
per Dave Keil, inefficient acquisition model
~90%
Gross margin
breakeven overall this year
150
Employees
per Bespoke, Aug 13 call
50-60%
Revenue in Europe
30-40% US, under 10% APAC, per Dave Keil
100%
Resurgens-held board
majority stake since Aug 2024, sole institutional investor
Jan 2026
Prior CEO removed
per Dave Keil, background misrepresentation, hidden SAP termination
$650-700K
OTE (comp anchor)
plus ~$10-15M equity at plan, per Bespoke
$100M
Path, per Dave Keil
"clear path" with the right GTM leader, no year attached
Only
purpose-built SAP AIOps platform
per Bespoke, true end-to-end niche leader
Healthy / on-thesis Watch Below target / needs restoring Context / unconfirmed

The pitch, in one paragraph

The only AIOps platform purpose-built for the SAP ecosystem, a real, differentiated product with retention in the low-to-mid-nineties, breakeven economics, and strong 90% gross margins. The problem is entirely go-to-market: per Dave Keil (Resurgens Operating Partner) on the Aug 20 call, the company has never had a formalized channel strategy, acquisition is inefficient (a two-year CAC payback), and the real competitive threat isn't Datadog or Dynatrace, it's SAP's own free, minimal tooling. The fix is a channel-centric motion through MSPs and GSIs, something the company is only now beginning to formalize. Not a product turnaround: a GTM build, with Dave Keil calling a path to a $100M business "clear" under the right leader.

Status

Aug 12
Alexandra Bossetta (Bespoke) re-engages with a new CEO search after Thread closed out. Full position spec sent.
Aug 12
Mike replies with Resurgens history (2022 conversations with Bryan West and Wayne Williams, NDA signed 2024) and six diligence questions. Call booked for Aug 13.
Aug 13
First call held with Alex Bossetta: real backstory on the CEO change, hard numbers (150 employees, ~$19M ARR, ~9% growth), confirmed SAP-specific experience is not required.
Aug 20
49-minute interview with Dave Keil (Resurgens Operating Partner, ex-CEO of QA Symphony). Candid rundown of the real numbers, competitive picture, and leadership backstory. Mutual interest confirmed; next step is Mark Haidet.
Aug 20
Mike sends a same-day thank-you note to Dave Keil, referencing the OutSystems parallel and the SAP-free-tooling competitive read.
Aug 20
Alex relays that Dave "thought you had a great meeting" and wants an intro to Mark Haidet (Operating Partner, Board Member). Bespoke confirms a debrief call for Monday, Aug 24, 4:00pm ET; the Haidet meeting is still being scheduled.
Next
Monday, Aug 24, 4:00pm ET: debrief and next-steps call with Bespoke. Mark Haidet intro to follow.

Leadership team

Running the company through the search under interim leadership.
Diogo FreireCFO & Interim CEO. CONFIRMED (Aug 13 call) NOT a candidate for the permanent seat: a strong, operational CFO, but not seen by the board as having the GTM/strategic capability the role needs.
Jan KarstensChief Technology Officer.
Brenton O'CallaganChief Product Officer. Per Bespoke, well regarded by the board.
Steve RandallChief Sales Officer. Per Dave Keil (Aug 20 call), the current revenue leader is effective in Europe but has not yet proven he can scale the US team, a flag worth raising directly rather than assuming it maps cleanly to this title.
Liz BlackmanChief Marketing Officer.
Darina DonohoeChief Transformation Officer.

Board, Resurgens Technology Partners

Sole institutional investor. Majority stake taken Aug 2024. No other outside board members.
Mark HaidetOperating Partner, Board Chair. NEXT STEP: intro being arranged for the week of Aug 24, following the positive Dave Keil call.
Dave KeilOperating Partner. Ex-CEO of QA Symphony (acquired by Tricentis, adjacent to the observability space). Held the Aug 20 interview; gave the most candid read on the business to date.
Fred Sturgis / Adi FilipovicManaging Directors, Resurgens co-founders.
Seth GreenInvestment Principal, deal lead on the original Avantra investment.

Leadership transition, January 2026

Material governance context, per Dave Keil on the Aug 20 call.

The prior CEO (the company's second, following the original founders' 2024 exit at the Resurgens deal) was removed by the board in January 2026 after it came to light that he had misrepresented parts of his background, including a prior termination from SAP that he had not disclosed. Separately, and earlier in the process, the executive team itself had already flagged a GTM execution gap (including a failed CRO hire) to the board. Worth understanding directly from Mark Haidet how the January change was communicated internally and to customers, and what, if anything, it changed about how the board evaluates candidates now.

Recruiter chain

Alexandra Bossetta, Partner at Bespoke Partners (leads their PE-backed CEO recruiting practice), re-engaged Mike on Aug 12 after the Thread search closed out. Emilie Pritchard (Bespoke) is cc'd but currently on vacation; an intro is still pending. Emma Sheldon (Bespoke, Search Coordinator) handles scheduling logistics.

Threat radar

The real competitive picture, per Dave Keil (Aug 20) and Alex Bossetta (Aug 13).
The real threat is SAP's own free tooling, not horizontal observability players (low-med). CONFIRMED (Aug 20 call, Dave Keil): the primary competitive threat is not Datadog or Dynatrace, it's SAP's own free, minimal built-in solution, which is "good enough" for customers who don't want to buy a dedicated tool. This reframes the competitive set entirely away from well-funded horizontal rivals.
Named vendor alternatives and inertia (watch). CONFIRMED (Aug 13 call, Alex Bossetta): when Avantra loses a deal, it's typically to "no decision" or a homegrown in-house tool that's good enough on observability/data collection even if it doesn't do everything Avantra does. Splunk shows up as a named general alternative; Sumo Logic competes more narrowly on the security side. Per Bespoke, Avantra remains the only niche player doing true end-to-end SAP observability today.
Channel motion is unbuilt (high, and the actual job). Per Dave Keil, go-to-market has historically been "very weak" with no concerted channel strategy. The path forward is channel-centric, leveraging MSPs and GSIs to win deals inside large organizations, a strategy the company is only now beginning to formalize under new channel leadership. This is the core of the mandate, not a side project.

Acquisition efficiency

Per Dave Keil, the business runs at roughly break-even with strong ~90% gross margins, but the customer acquisition model is inefficient: about a two-year payback period. That combination, healthy unit margins but slow payback, points squarely at a GTM efficiency problem (spend, targeting, channel leverage) rather than a product or pricing problem.

Geography

Per Dave Keil (Aug 20), revenue splits roughly 50-60% Europe, 30-40% US, and under 10% APAC. This is the same structural shape as the OutSystems turnaround Mike led (joined at 65% EMEA revenue, grew the business from $65M to $200M over three years while flipping the mix toward North America), which he raised directly on both calls.

Dave Keil, Aug 20 call: a strong, differentiated product with retention in the low-to-mid-nineties and a real path to a hundred-million-dollar business, if the right go-to-market leader can build the channel motion the company has never had.

The mandate, per the position spec and the two calls

A GTM build on a profitable, differentiated product, not a product turnaround.
TargetValue
Revenue growthGrow NA revenue materially while sustaining EMEA; re-accelerate off ~9% 1H26 growth
RetentionSpec claims >100% net retention, NPS 81; Dave Keil's insider figure (Aug 20) is materially different: low-to-mid-nineties. Treat the spec's number with real skepticism until verified post-NDA.
GTM infrastructureBuild a formal coverage model and channel strategy (MSPs, GSIs); none has existed to date
CAC efficiencyImprove on the current roughly two-year payback period
Product alignmentKeep the platform aligned to SAP's own roadmap (S/4HANA, RISE with SAP, cloud, AI)
ExitSpec names an explicit outcome: "company prepared for 4-year exit"
GeographyRemote, NA or Europe, East Coast presence required; meaningful India-based team too
SAP-specific experience is explicitly NOT required, per Alex Bossetta on the Aug 13 call: a similar or applicable channel motion is what matters. That removes the one real stretch item on the earlier read of the spec.

The retention discrepancy, unpacked

The Aug 12 position spec states net retention above 100% and an NPS of 81, a genuinely strong number if accurate. But Dave Keil, a board member speaking candidly on Aug 20, put actual retention at "low-to-mid-nineties," a materially weaker figure. That is a meaningful gap between the recruiter-facing story and the insider account, and it echoes the same "restore" pattern seen on the Tyk opportunity. Top diligence priority once real data is available: cohort retention actuals, and an honest reconciliation of why the spec's number and the board's own account of the business don't match.

Full process timeline

Aug 12
Alex Bossetta (Bespoke) re-engages: new CEO search at Avantra, position spec attached.
Aug 12
Mike replies with Resurgens history and six diligence questions (prior CEO, Diogo Freire's candidacy, search timeline, NA underperformance, board involvement, comp). Call booked for Aug 13, 10:30am-12:00pm ET.
Aug 13
First call with Alex Bossetta (90 min). Real backstory on the CEO change (board-driven, after execs flagged the GTM gap); Diogo Freire confirmed not a candidate; hard numbers surfaced for the first time; SAP experience confirmed not required; search had been widened beyond SAP-only candidates.
Aug 20
Interview with Dave Keil (49 min). Far more candid rundown: real retention figure (low-to-mid-nineties, not >100%), ~2-year CAC payback, the SAP-free-tooling competitive threat, the January leadership change and why it happened, and Mike's own CoreStory situation discussed as part of mutual vetting.
Aug 20
Mike sends a same-day thank-you email to Dave Keil. Alex relays Dave's positive read and proposes a Mark Haidet intro. Bespoke confirms a Monday, Aug 24, 4:00pm ET debrief call; the Haidet meeting is still being scheduled.
Next
Monday, Aug 24, 4:00pm ET: debrief call with Bespoke. Mark Haidet intro to follow.

Open questions by stakeholder

To close before a decision point.
Mark Haidet / board: reconcile the spec's >100% retention claim against Dave Keil's low-to-mid-nineties figure; the search's timeline and how many other candidates remain in process; board risk tolerance and process changes following the January CEO removal; real comp/equity structure once a genuine conversation starts.
Team: who owns the US sales-leadership gap and the plan to close it; review the channel strategy deck once Bespoke sends it (requested on the Aug 20 call); how the org has stabilized since the January transition.
Data (post-NDA): true cohort retention data, CAC payback trend, pipeline and win-loss versus Splunk, Sumo Logic, and DIY/no-decision, customer concentration, and the current channel/partner pipeline if any exists.

Risk register

Key risks to the opportunity and the business.
RiskSeverityMitigation / note
Retention discrepancy: spec says >100%, Dave Keil says low-to-mid-90sHighGet real cohort data post-NDA before underwriting either number; ask Mark Haidet directly which figure the board itself believes
No formalized go-to-market or channel strategy to dateHighThis is the entire job. Review the channel strategy deck once sent, and press on why it's taken this long to formalize
Inefficient acquisition: ~2-year CAC paybackMediumUnderstand the spend/targeting mix driving this before committing to a re-acceleration plan
January 2026 CEO removal for background misrepresentationMediumA governance red flag, though board-driven and handled directly; understand internal/customer fallout and any lasting trust deficit
Current revenue leader unproven at US scaleMediumPer Dave Keil, effective in Europe but not yet proven in the US; likely a near-term team decision for a new CEO
Single institutional investor, no outside check on the boardMedium100% Resurgens-controlled board, which cuts both ways: fast decisions, but no outside counterweight if priorities diverge
Concentrated platform risk: tied to SAP's own roadmap paceMediumGrowth is capped by SAP's cloud/RISE migration timeline regardless of GTM execution
Small scale, early processLow-Med~$19M ARR, 150 employees; one call plus one interview done, no live comp negotiation yet, other candidates reportedly still in the process
Competitive threat is actually low relative to the categoryLowReal threat is SAP's own free tooling and inertia, not a well-funded direct rival; a genuine positive versus Tyk's more crowded field

Comp position (as shared by Bespoke, Aug 13)

Roughly $650 to $700K OTE plus $10 to $15M in equity at plan, with Bespoke describing it as flexible for the right candidate. No live negotiation has happened yet, this is an early anchor shared ahead of the Dave Keil call, not a comp discussion with the board itself. The Mark Haidet conversation is the first real chance to test structure (cash versus equity mix, vesting, acceleration) rather than a fixed number.

Equity at plan, as framed by Bespoke (placeholder, no offer or cap table shared yet)

Resurgens quoted a ~$10-15M equity range directly rather than a percentage; no exit valuation, preference stack, or fully diluted ownership number has been shared. Treat the figures below as bounding the recruiter's own framing, not an independent model.
ScenarioLow endHigh end
Equity at plan, as quoted$10M$15M
Annual OTE$650K$700K
Because no fully diluted percentage or preference terms exist yet, the exit-multiple table used for Tyk isn't meaningful here until real numbers are shared. See the equity model on options.mikelambert.com for the general framework once Avantra terms are known.
Open items before signing: fully diluted ownership percentage, preference stack and participating vs. non-participating terms, option pool sizing, vesting schedule, and change-of-control acceleration. None of this has been discussed yet.

Path-to-$100M model

Stress-test Dave Keil's "clear path to $100M" claim against different growth assumptions. Inputs save in your browser.
ARR at 24 months
ARR at 36 months
Years to $100M, at this rate
Rule of 40 (est.)
ARR at 24/36mo compounds the assumed growth rate over current ARR. Years to $100M solves the same compounding for time instead of level (shown as 15+ if the growth rate would never realistically get there). Rule of 40 = growth% + adjusted EBITDA margin%, useful mainly to show how far a still-modest growth rate is from that bar today. Retention and CAC payback are shown for reference but not yet wired into the compounding; both are qualitative until real cohort data is available post-NDA.

Pros / cons (current read, post-Dave Keil call)

My current read, weighed against CoreStory and the other live options. Updated from the options.mikelambert.com decision board to reflect the Aug 20 Dave Keil call.
Pros
  • Real, differentiated product: the only AIOps platform purpose-built for the SAP ecosystem, breakeven with strong ~90% gross margins, and per Dave Keil, a "clear path" to a hundred-million-dollar business with the right GTM leader.
  • Confirmed a pure GTM mandate, not a product turnaround, and a near-identical structural match to the OutSystems flip I already executed: EMEA-heavy revenue, an underbuilt NA channel motion, and a two-year payback problem I've solved before.
  • SAP-specific experience is explicitly not required (Aug 13 call), removing the one real stretch item on the original spec.
  • Healthy governance signal on balance: the January CEO change was ultimately board-driven after the executive team itself flagged the GTM gap, and I'm not a cold start with Resurgens (2022 history, an NDA signed in 2024).
  • Comp is real and reasonable this early: roughly $650 to $700K OTE plus $10 to $15M equity at plan, with Bespoke describing it as flexible.
  • Remote, NA or Europe, no relocation requirement.
Cons
  • The retention story doesn't hold up: the spec claims >100% net retention, but Dave Keil's own figure is low-to-mid-nineties. That's a real credibility gap in the recruiter-facing materials that needs independent verification.
  • Go-to-market is a genuine blank slate, not a tuneup: per Dave Keil, there has never been a formalized channel strategy, and the ~2-year CAC payback shows it in the numbers.
  • Small scale: ~$19M ARR, 150 employees, ~9% current growth. Earlier and smaller than the "leader" framing in the original spec suggested.
  • A real governance flag: the prior CEO was removed in January for misrepresenting his background, including a hidden SAP termination. Worth understanding the cultural fallout directly with the board.
  • Concentrated platform risk: tied entirely to SAP's own migration/roadmap pace (S/4HANA, RISE, cloud), which caps the ceiling regardless of GTM execution.
  • Still very early: one call plus one interview done, no live comp negotiation, and reportedly other candidates still in the process. Same CoreStory departure-cost consideration applies to any external move.
Bottom line so far: the strongest structural fit to a playbook I've already run (OutSystems), on a genuinely differentiated, profitable product, with a materially more candid picture after the Dave Keil call than the spec alone suggested. The retention discrepancy and the unformalized channel strategy are the two things to resolve before this can move from promising to a real offer conversation, both should get sharper after the Mark Haidet meeting and post-NDA data.