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The only AIOps platform purpose-built for the SAP ecosystem, a real, differentiated product with retention in the low-to-mid-nineties, breakeven economics, and strong 90% gross margins. The problem is entirely go-to-market: per Dave Keil (Resurgens Operating Partner) on the Aug 20 call, the company has never had a formalized channel strategy, acquisition is inefficient (a two-year CAC payback), and the real competitive threat isn't Datadog or Dynatrace, it's SAP's own free, minimal tooling. The fix is a channel-centric motion through MSPs and GSIs, something the company is only now beginning to formalize. Not a product turnaround: a GTM build, with Dave Keil calling a path to a $100M business "clear" under the right leader.
| Diogo Freire | CFO & Interim CEO. CONFIRMED (Aug 13 call) NOT a candidate for the permanent seat: a strong, operational CFO, but not seen by the board as having the GTM/strategic capability the role needs. |
| Jan Karstens | Chief Technology Officer. |
| Brenton O'Callagan | Chief Product Officer. Per Bespoke, well regarded by the board. |
| Steve Randall | Chief Sales Officer. Per Dave Keil (Aug 20 call), the current revenue leader is effective in Europe but has not yet proven he can scale the US team, a flag worth raising directly rather than assuming it maps cleanly to this title. |
| Liz Blackman | Chief Marketing Officer. |
| Darina Donohoe | Chief Transformation Officer. |
| Mark Haidet | Operating Partner, Board Chair. NEXT STEP: intro being arranged for the week of Aug 24, following the positive Dave Keil call. |
| Dave Keil | Operating Partner. Ex-CEO of QA Symphony (acquired by Tricentis, adjacent to the observability space). Held the Aug 20 interview; gave the most candid read on the business to date. |
| Fred Sturgis / Adi Filipovic | Managing Directors, Resurgens co-founders. |
| Seth Green | Investment Principal, deal lead on the original Avantra investment. |
The prior CEO (the company's second, following the original founders' 2024 exit at the Resurgens deal) was removed by the board in January 2026 after it came to light that he had misrepresented parts of his background, including a prior termination from SAP that he had not disclosed. Separately, and earlier in the process, the executive team itself had already flagged a GTM execution gap (including a failed CRO hire) to the board. Worth understanding directly from Mark Haidet how the January change was communicated internally and to customers, and what, if anything, it changed about how the board evaluates candidates now.
Alexandra Bossetta, Partner at Bespoke Partners (leads their PE-backed CEO recruiting practice), re-engaged Mike on Aug 12 after the Thread search closed out. Emilie Pritchard (Bespoke) is cc'd but currently on vacation; an intro is still pending. Emma Sheldon (Bespoke, Search Coordinator) handles scheduling logistics.
Per Dave Keil, the business runs at roughly break-even with strong ~90% gross margins, but the customer acquisition model is inefficient: about a two-year payback period. That combination, healthy unit margins but slow payback, points squarely at a GTM efficiency problem (spend, targeting, channel leverage) rather than a product or pricing problem.
Per Dave Keil (Aug 20), revenue splits roughly 50-60% Europe, 30-40% US, and under 10% APAC. This is the same structural shape as the OutSystems turnaround Mike led (joined at 65% EMEA revenue, grew the business from $65M to $200M over three years while flipping the mix toward North America), which he raised directly on both calls.
| Target | Value |
|---|---|
| Revenue growth | Grow NA revenue materially while sustaining EMEA; re-accelerate off ~9% 1H26 growth |
| Retention | Spec claims >100% net retention, NPS 81; Dave Keil's insider figure (Aug 20) is materially different: low-to-mid-nineties. Treat the spec's number with real skepticism until verified post-NDA. |
| GTM infrastructure | Build a formal coverage model and channel strategy (MSPs, GSIs); none has existed to date |
| CAC efficiency | Improve on the current roughly two-year payback period |
| Product alignment | Keep the platform aligned to SAP's own roadmap (S/4HANA, RISE with SAP, cloud, AI) |
| Exit | Spec names an explicit outcome: "company prepared for 4-year exit" |
| Geography | Remote, NA or Europe, East Coast presence required; meaningful India-based team too |
The Aug 12 position spec states net retention above 100% and an NPS of 81, a genuinely strong number if accurate. But Dave Keil, a board member speaking candidly on Aug 20, put actual retention at "low-to-mid-nineties," a materially weaker figure. That is a meaningful gap between the recruiter-facing story and the insider account, and it echoes the same "restore" pattern seen on the Tyk opportunity. Top diligence priority once real data is available: cohort retention actuals, and an honest reconciliation of why the spec's number and the board's own account of the business don't match.
| Risk | Severity | Mitigation / note |
|---|---|---|
| Retention discrepancy: spec says >100%, Dave Keil says low-to-mid-90s | High | Get real cohort data post-NDA before underwriting either number; ask Mark Haidet directly which figure the board itself believes |
| No formalized go-to-market or channel strategy to date | High | This is the entire job. Review the channel strategy deck once sent, and press on why it's taken this long to formalize |
| Inefficient acquisition: ~2-year CAC payback | Medium | Understand the spend/targeting mix driving this before committing to a re-acceleration plan |
| January 2026 CEO removal for background misrepresentation | Medium | A governance red flag, though board-driven and handled directly; understand internal/customer fallout and any lasting trust deficit |
| Current revenue leader unproven at US scale | Medium | Per Dave Keil, effective in Europe but not yet proven in the US; likely a near-term team decision for a new CEO |
| Single institutional investor, no outside check on the board | Medium | 100% Resurgens-controlled board, which cuts both ways: fast decisions, but no outside counterweight if priorities diverge |
| Concentrated platform risk: tied to SAP's own roadmap pace | Medium | Growth is capped by SAP's cloud/RISE migration timeline regardless of GTM execution |
| Small scale, early process | Low-Med | ~$19M ARR, 150 employees; one call plus one interview done, no live comp negotiation yet, other candidates reportedly still in the process |
| Competitive threat is actually low relative to the category | Low | Real threat is SAP's own free tooling and inertia, not a well-funded direct rival; a genuine positive versus Tyk's more crowded field |
Roughly $650 to $700K OTE plus $10 to $15M in equity at plan, with Bespoke describing it as flexible for the right candidate. No live negotiation has happened yet, this is an early anchor shared ahead of the Dave Keil call, not a comp discussion with the board itself. The Mark Haidet conversation is the first real chance to test structure (cash versus equity mix, vesting, acceleration) rather than a fixed number.
| Scenario | Low end | High end |
|---|---|---|
| Equity at plan, as quoted | $10M | $15M |
| Annual OTE | $650K | $700K |